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RESERVE COMPONENT SPECIAL FORCES

INTEGRATION AND DEFINITION
OF THE SPECIAL FORCES

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A significant portion of USSOCOM assigned forces are Reserve Component units, yet the statement often heard from Regular officers at USSOCOM is "if we can't use them, what good are they...?" The question is certainly fair enough on the surface, but is a clarion for much greater knowledge and understanding of the Reserve force and its employment potential. The Cohen-Nunn Act of October 1986, as an attachment to the Fiscal Year 1987 Defense Authorization Act, designed the framework for the establishment of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Implementing law, Public Law 99-661, was specific in the assignment of all Reserve Component Army Special Forces, to include those of the Army National Guard, to the joint four-star command. Although strongly opposed within Department of Defense (DOD) and by the Services, after five years of operation, the Command has largely proven the merit of the Congressional foresight. However, optimum utilization of the assigned Reserve Component Special Forces remains elusive and superficial. This study provides viable and dynamic integration and employment models for Reserve Component Special Forces to enhance a CINC's Peacetime Engagement strategy.

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RESERVE COMPONENT SPECIAL FORCES

INTEGRATION AND EMPLOYMENT

MODELS

FOR THE

OPERATIONAL CONTINUUM

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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
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The Congressional mandate for the establishment of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) concurrently transferred all Reserve Component Special Operating Forces from various service reserve components to the new Command. However, the question most often heard from Regular Army officers at USSOCOM regarding these forces is "if we can't use them, what good are they...? The question is fair enough. It illustrates clearly the pervasive ignorance of the Reserve Component, which is not surprising based on past levels of integration in the Total Army. USSOCOM and subordinate command staffs remain woefully unresourced in Reserve Component Active Guard Reserve (AGR) officers and non-commissioned officers, without whose presence, Reserve issues and perspective are not successfully integrated. This insufficiency of Reserve Component integration at the highest levels insures limited information transfer within the Total Force, and assures a much less than optimum utilization of the substantial Reserve Component force structure assigned to the Commander-in-Chief Special Operations Command:¹

Special Forces	45%
Civil Affairs	97%
Navy SEALS	20%
Special Boat Units	57%
AC 130 Gunships	50%
USAF Volant Solo	100%

The purpose of this paper is to present the employment capabilities currently residing in Reserve Component Special Forces Groups, and how they might be proactively integrated and employed. The objective is to answer unequivocally the availability for "use" question - Reserve Component Special Forces are legally available and capable of operational employment. Use them!

CURRENT FORCES

The Reserve Component (RC) Special Forces Groups (Airborne) (SFGA) are located across the breadth of the Continental United States. The troop unit listing, located in the appendices, indicates geographic location to battalion level, but few of the Special Forces companies are co-located with the battalion headquarters. Consider that while 3-11 SFGA battalion headquarters is in Perrine, FL, companies are located in Tampa, FL, Columbus, GA, and Winston-Salem, NC. This situation is typical, and is a necessity based on demographic imperatives for the USAR and ARNG Special Forces Groups. The units act as "magnets" in the recruiting of prior service and 18-series personnel, as well as for recruiting non-prior service, high-quality personnel.

A synopsis of RC SFODA is presented in the following analysis of six Special Forces Operational Detachments A (SFODA), comprising 64 personnel. --These Detachments, from 1-11 Special Forces Groups (Airborne) (SFGA), were interviewed during their participation in a major SOF (Special Operations Forces) exercise in Europe during 1990. They operated in Norway and Denmark in consonance with

assigned mission requirements of Special Reconnaissance (SR) and Direct Action (DA).

The SFODA were launched by 1-11 SFGA Forward Operational Base (FOB) in the United Kingdom. The four Norway SFODA were interviewed during the redeployment phase at the Exercise Support Headquarters in Norway, and the two Denmark SFODA were interviewed while in the Isolation phase at the FOB.

PROFILE SYNOPSIS:²

AVERAGE AGE	34+years
MARRIED	57 percent
BA/BS EDUCATION	35 percent
PRIOR SERVICE	79 percent
MOSQ YEARS TENURE	7+years
ACTIVE DUTY	73 percent
YEARS SERVICE AC	3+years
RC	9 years
Current SFODA	5.5 years
PT TIMES/WK	4(-)
RUN DISTANCE	3+miles
ABN PROF/CE per YR	4+
DFT/YEAR CONUS	3+
OCONUS	2.5 last five years
LANGUAGE RATED	37+percent
NORDIC SKI ABILITY	Less than Intermediate
OWN SKI EQUIP	55 percent
TIMES SKI/YR	9+
WARTIME CAPABILITY	
SELF-ASSESSMENT	
PERSONAL	Good+
DETACHMENT	Good(-)

The "ageing of the force" question has been an Active Component (AC) concern of the RC SFGA for a number of years. The average age of these SFODA at 34 was not extreme, and generally,

the force to continue becoming younger as Vietnam era soldiers leave or retire from the units. Additionally, the number of personnel who were awarded MOSQ through the now defunct RC Special Forces Qualification program is rapidly waning. The 27% RCSFQC figure resident in these profiled teams has undoubtedly been reduced in the past two years, and with it, also the aggregate age of the SFODAs. One can readily project that within the near future, the average age of RC SFQA teams will be in the 30 years old range and that 100% of personnel on the teams will be active duty/"long-course" Special Forces Qualification Course graduates.

Unit cohesion was analyzed based on the composite basis of each SFODA as a percentage of assigned to total deployed, with a time factoring based on the length of time assigned personnel had been with the SFODA.

Special Forces doctrine states that a "Team" is any mission-tailored element from a minimum of two personnel to an indeterminate number of personnel. Tailoring is an essential requirement and unique capability within the special operations force. Generally, a deployable detachment for exercise/mission capability in EUCOM has been defined as a minimum of one officer, one communicator, and one medic, comprising a total not less than six personnel.³

A concern in readiness analysis for both the AC and RC SFODA is the formation of "ad hoc" SFODA in order to meet minimum personnel requirements for ARTEP or exercise deployment. The term cross-leveling is used to describe the temporary assignment of

personnel to meet operational minimums caused by either a shortfall in deployable key personnel, or to meet a minimum requirements in numbers of personnel.

RC SF companies are relatively stable, with typically less than a 10% turnover in MOSQ personnel. This characteristic is unique to the RC SFGA, when compared to both RC and AC personnel "turbulence." While RC conventional forces sustain personnel turnover greater than that of the RC SFGA, AC counterparts have a far greater turbulence exceeding 50% per year. Consider that in 1985, Army divisions averaged 53.6% turnover, while the 101st Air Assault Division had a 60.4% turnover of personnel.⁴ These personnel turnover/"turbulence" rates are the norm for AC personnel management in units. Consider that in FY '90, the TTHS account (Trainees, Transients, Holdees, Students) daily average was 83,000 active duty personnel. AC SFGA turbulence exceeds 30% for forward deployed/OCONUS units,⁵ and likely reflects AC Army-wide TTHS account percentages in CONUS.

RC SFGA stability abrogates the negative affects of this "ad hoc" of SFODAs, especially when cross-leveling is accomplished within SF companies. Salient to this "ad hoc" concern, is the special operators perspective that the SFODA is the trained base for mission tailoring.

Further analysis indicates only one individual was cross-leveled to meet a mission-critical MOS shortfall. This mission shortfall cross-level was met internally within the parent company, which not surprisingly was for a Medic. The analysis also

indicates that all but one cross-leveled was accomplished "internally" or within parent companies. In this case, the cross-level moved an Intelligence Sergeant from A Company to C Company to increase the SFODA to twelve personnel. The following data represents the 32% cross-leveled by MOS:

<u>XO</u>	<u>OPNS SGT</u>	<u>INTEL SGT</u>	<u>ENGR</u>	<u>MEDIC</u>	<u>COMMS</u>	<u>WPNS</u>
II	III	II	I	IIII*	IIII	IIII

Based on discussions with the Group and battalion personnel, a major reason for bringing each of the deployable SFODA to maximum strength of twelve was the determination to place as many personnel as possible on the ground in OCONUS/ operational areas. This is an operating standard exercised by both 11 and 20 SFGA at every opportunity. Therefore, in determining the readiness cohesion of an SFODA, one must look at the base detachment first, and then look at the reason for and source of the personnel being cross-leveled.

The analysis indicates that "base deployable SFODAs" were cross-leveled internally by parent companies in order to exercise more personnel OCONUS.⁶ Additionally, cross-leveling was not done to meet mission capability requirements/minimums.

These deployed SFODA profiles indicated that approximately 32% of the force was cross-leveled in preparation for the deployment; 68% of the deployed force were not cross-leveled, and they reflected a cohesive average of 5.45 years tenure with their SFODA.

MOSQ

Levels of MOSQ in the RC SFGA has been a long-standing criticism, but one which has since the late 1980's been decremented almost exclusively by funding/resources. The determination to use the active duty Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) as the sole source of MOSQ for the RC SFGA proved to be one of the best moves made in upgrading and increasing the readiness of the force. However, high quality recruits are being held in the SF companies pending school openings or training monies due to systemic disconnects and oversights by those programming Army Reserve Component SOF budgets. The RC MOSQ problem is an in-house, self-induced shortfall. The units are achieving quality recruiting; the system is failing to follow-through.

Both AC and RC SFGA have been reflecting a somewhat similar 10% shortfall from their respective MOSQ targets. The RC SFGA have made steady growth in MOSQ since the early 1960s, averaging an 8-10% increase in MOSQ each decade. Currently, RC SFGA average in the 70% range, while maintaining C2 and C3 readiness postures. Historical data, and given the proven ability of the RC SFGA to support the active duty/"long-course" SFQC program, one can project a 15% to 20% increase in RC MOSQ, in the next decade.⁷

The salient determinant in the status of MOSQ in the RC SFGA is whether or not the funds, resources and manpower will be made available by USASOC in support of RC personnel available for MOS schooling. RC Special Forces unit commanders believe they can provide the quality input. Many of these commanders, however,

believe that funding and the systemic malaise must be dynamically corrected to portend well for the future.

MISSION SPECIFIC TRAINING

Doctrine clearly directs Special Forces units to train for specific mission requirements per Theater CINC OPLANS and directives. As stated in FM 80-1 (Nov 89), pp 7-1, 7-6, 7-7, SFODAs typically train for no more than two of the four SF missions, and that "Special Forces units train to OPLAN requirements not to doctrinal missions." Both 11 and 20 SFGA trained as directed by their warfighting CINC for Special Reconnaissance (SR) and Direct Action (DA) missions, with specific priority of one mission over the other.

However, the Groups in practice, have conducted limited Foreign Internal Defense (FID)/UW training by virtue of the combined training environment and exchange programs in which they often participate. 1-11 SFGA maintains the capability of instructing Programs of Instruction in both Norwegian (48 hour) and Danish (24 hour). As an example, the SFODB acting as Exercise Support Headquarters in Dombas, Norway during FTX MOSKUS 90 presented extensive weapons, demolitions, communications, and medical training to the soldiers of the Norwegian Home Guard. The 20 SFGA has presented special skills training to both Italian and Spanish forces in the past.

OCONUS OPTEMPO CY87-91

The optempo accomplished by RC SFGA has established a proven capability. By 1987, both 11 and 20 SFGA were establishing respective Special Forces Operating Bases (SFOB) and Forward Operating Bases (FOB), launching/recovering SFODAs, sending/terminating communications and providing the admin/logistics required to support Group operations. Consider that in 1987, 20 SFGA deployed fifteen SFODA and four SFODB in seven European countries. 11 SFGA deployed approximately twenty SFODAs during the same year in multiple exercises to Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom. A similar optempo occurred in 1988, with 20 SFGA committing twelve SFODA, and multiple Forward Operating Bases (FOB) in Italy, Germany, and Spain. 11 SFGA committed six SFODA to exercises in Germany, while conducting winter warfare training in New York and New Hampshire.

In 1989, 20 SFGA committed ten SFODA and two SFODB to Italy, Spain, and Germany, supported by an FOB. 11 SFGA returned to Norway and the United Kingdom with an FOB, a SFODB and six SFODA.

1990 was again active with 20 SFGA committing SFODAs to Germany, Italy, and Turkey, for the first time. 11 SFGA was extensively employed in Norway and Denmark in three separate exercises. Additionally, 11 SFGA conducted winter warfare training in Utah and West Virginia, and re-established the Special Air Service (SAS) exchange with 23 SAS Regiment at Hereford, England.

11 SFGA deployed five SFODA to Norway to attend a Norwegian winter warfare course in the first quarter 1991. Although all completed the training successfully, more importantly the entire

contingent completed the 30 KM Ski March (race) with 25 lbs rucksack and service rifle. This is exceptional, as typically 40% fail to make qualifying times. The AFNORTH observers reported, in message traffic that overall performance of these units was "excellent."⁸

In a significant event for the Special Forces community, an AOB and two SFODAs successfully participated in a major threshold winter warfare exercise, as the first US SF in what has historically been a SAS-exclusive event. CINCNORTH (British four star general) and COMNON (Norwegian three star general) were "quite pleased" with the performance of these SFODA, commenting that "...compared quite favorably with active duty counterparts."⁹

The Group also programmed Winter Warfare training in Washington state and Labrador, CANADA. Another battalion was projected to conduct "over-the-horizon" waterborne infiltration training with NAVSPECWARGRU ONE at Coronado, California. 11 SFGA continued the ongoing Special Air Service (SAS) exchange, which included Joint Combined Exercises for Training (JCET) in UK and CONUS with 21 and 23 SAS (TAVR).

Meanwhile, 20 SFGA had been informally alerted in early NOV 90, for possible activation/mobilization in support of DESERT SHIELD/STORM. See Appendix C.

- - -

20 SFGA (ARNG) ACTIVATION FOR DESERT SHIELD

Responding to a formal USSOCOM request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 3 DEC 90, and following an extensive and critical "staff

review" by the Army and Joint Staff, the requested 3 Jan 91 activation date was ordered for 20 Feb 91.

Following formal alert notification on 1 Feb 91, 20 SFGA increased their training tempo, used a combination of IDT-(Inactive Duty Training) and active duty status to increase their training tempo while at home stations. The Group was federally activated on 20 FEB 91 and closed the Ft. Bragg MOB-site on 22 FEB 91.

The Group arrived overstrength in personnel, and was committed in three primary directions: (a) Pre-SFAS training, to include Basic Airborne School, (b) SFAS/SFQC, and (c) Certification and Validation of its' SFODA/B. It is interesting to note that active duty coordinators had not anticipated the Group arriving with a recruited personnel pool, administratively and physically prepared to undergo training at various levels of training from Basic Airborne to the Special Forces Qualification Course.

7 SFGA and US Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) provided outstanding support and assistance. The results of the 90 day activation are noteworthy and refute the "derived" conclusions of the infamous 1989 ARI Study which ostensibly determined them incapable of achieving such capability. Refer to Appendix B. 20 SFGA demonstrated in practical terms the level of training readiness the RC SFGA attain and sustain in their annual training cycles:

(1) Per OPLANS, the 200K Force List battalion met all mobilization requirements within the prescribed ninety-six hours period.

(2) Within a 40+/- day period, all operational SFODA (81%) and SFODB (100%) were certified and validated by USASFC. The time limiter was availability of range and support facilities. Many believe the process could have been accomplished within a two week period. CG, USASFC and USCINCSOC found 20 SFGA fully prepared for operational deployment and "combat ready."¹⁰

(3) During the activated period, in addition to those personnel entered into SFAS and SFQC, new recruits numbering 124 personnel completed Basic Airborne Training with a 100% success rate.

It should be noted that the 19% shortfall in SFODAs declared "combat ready" is the same shortfall taken into the validation process. This shortfall was driven by MOSQ shortages, caused by the ongoing systemic and funding problems discussed earlier.

When 20 SFGA demobilized, over 200 of it's personnel remained on temporary active duty for training at various levels of MOSQ training.

For all the successes, however, 20 SFGA demobilized with over 50 volunteers posted to Operation PROVIDE COMFORT as individual "fillers." Both 7 SFGA and 20 SFGA protested the methodology of using their personnel as individual replacements. For many of the 20 SFGA officers and men the ever present suspicion between AC and RC had again surfaced - that the active component will use reserve units as individual replacements only.

US ARMY RESERVE SFGA COST COMPARATIVE

Military pay (MPA/RPA/NGPA) and Operations & Maintenance funds (O&M) are the two basic budget categories used in this cost comparative for active and reserve component SFGA. See Appendix D.

TO&E equipment and Housing/billeting are not included in this annualized compilation. Although the presentation is simplistic, it captures a close representation of the cost differentials between RC SFGA and AC SFGA.¹¹

The cost for an RC unit is generally considered to be between 20 and 25% of an Ac unit, depending on the specific type unit. The cost factor/ratio for maintaining an Active Component and a Reserve Component SFGA are:

\$ 50.5/AC SFGA : \$ 13.2/RC SFGA

3.8 : 1

Stated more generally, four RC SFGA can be maintained in reserve for the cost of one SFGA in the Active Component. Besides the advisable aspect of involving a democratic people in the conduct of their military enterprise, fiscal consideration is a major determinant in the establishment of the reserve military structure.

THE MOBILIZATION SPECTRUM

The spectrum for accessing the Reserve Component can be viewed in two basic categories based on active duty by executive authority and Mobilization under Congressional review or purview. The chart "Reserve Force Activation and Mobilization Criteria," illustrates

Reserve Force Activation and Mobilization Criteria

TYPE	ACTIVE DUTY	OPERATIONAL ACTIVATION	SELECTIVE MOBILIZATION	PARTIAL MOBILIZATION	FULL MOBILIZATION	TOTAL MOBILIZATION
AUTHORITY STATUS	DOD VOLUNTARY/ INVOLUNTARY	PRESIDENT INVOLUNTARY	PRESIDENT/ CONGRESS INVOLUNTARY	PRESIDENT/ CONGRESS INVOLUNTARY	CONGRESS INVOLUNTARY	CONGRESS INVOLUNTARY
PURPOSE	TRAINING/ AUGMENTATION	ANY OPERATIONAL MISSION	DOMESTIC EMERGENCY WITH NO EXTERNAL THREAT	EXTERNAL THREAT OR WAR	EXTERNAL THREAT OR WAR	EXTERNAL THREAT OR WAR
LENGTH	NOT LIMITED BY LAW	Non-Combat Forces 90+90 days	N/A	24 MONTHS	DURATION + 6 MONTHS	DURATION + 6 MONTHS
FORCE LEVEL	READY RESERVE ONLY	200,000 ALL SERVICES	N/A	1,000,000	2,900,000 READY RESERVES (+)	ALL RESERVES
REMARKS	<u>10 USC 672(a)</u> <u>SECRETARIAL CALL-UP (15 day)</u> <u>(10 USC 672(b)</u>	<u>10 USC 673(b)</u> <u>SELECTED RESERVE ONLY</u>	<u>10 USC 673</u> <u>READY RESERVE (10 USC 288, 672 and 673)</u>	<u>10 USC 673</u> <u>READY RESERVE (10 USC 288, 672 and 673)</u>	<u>10 USC 672 (a)</u> <u>READY, STANDBY and RETIRED RESERVE</u> <u>(10 USC 273, 688</u>	<u>EXPAND ALL ARMED FORCES BEYOND EXISTING FORCE STRUCTURE</u>
			<u>10 USC 268(b)</u> <u>DESIGNATED AS OPERATIONAL OR AUGMENTATION UNITS</u>	<u>NO THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY</u>	<u>NATIONAL EMERGENCY/ JOINT RESOLUTION</u>	
					<u>NOT NATIONAL EMERGENCY AND NOT FOR TRAINING</u>	

the spectrum from individual voluntary active duty to a national Total Mobilization. A detailed explanation of the various categories of reserve component duty status is provided in Appendix E.

The first category of "Executive/By-law" access of the RC comprises those active duty options which are established by-law within executive authority and not requiring Congressional approval:

(1) Annual Training - Maximum of 15 days, by-law; involuntary requirement for Selected Reserve personnel.

(2) Inactive Duty for Training (IDT) - Unit Training Assemblies (UTAs); not constrained by law; typically resourced at 48 per year or 54 per year for Special Forces units. Involuntary requirement for Selected Reserve.

(3) Active Duty for Training (ADT) - Voluntary, unrestricted time for training on active duty.

(4) Temporary Tour of Active Duty (TTAD) - Voluntary, unrestricted by time and nature of duty, in support of active component requirements.

(5) Active Duty Special Work (ADSW) - Voluntary, unrestricted by time and nature of duty, in support of reserve component requirements.

(6) Operational Activation - Selected Reserve units and individuals only, involuntary active duty for operational purposes only, for a maximum of 200,000 personnel for up to 180 days (360 days for combat units, pending requested change in law).

The second category along the spectrum starts with "Selective Mobilization and requires concurrence by Congress:

(1) Selective Mobilization - Involuntary mobilization of Ready Reserve for domestic emergencies not involving an external threat.

(2) Partial Mobilization - Involuntary mobilization of up to 1 million personnel of the 2.9 million Ready Reserve for a period not longer 24 months. Requires external threat or threat of war.

(3) Full Mobilization - Involuntary mobilization by Congress of up to 2.9 million Ready Reserve for a period not to exceed the duration of the threat or war, plus six months.

(4) Total Mobilization - Involuntary mobilization of all reserves and start of reconstitution of forces. Requires external threat or war, and is for the duration of the threat or war, plus six months.

During Operation Desert Shield/Storm, the progression in accessing the RC went from (a) category one, voluntary active duty using TTAD/ADSW, to (b) category one, Operational Activation, to final state of (c) category two, Partial Mobilization. One should note that most of the Gulf War was fought using reserve forces without Congressionally provided forces. "Partial Mobilization" occurred early in 1991 well after the reserve was fully employed. excepting the still contentious employment of reserve combat maneuver forces.

The spectrum is fully supportive of the operational continuum,

allowing for an expansive and long-term employment of reserve forces. However, it should be recognized that the specific limitations found in the law reflect an attempt to protect the RC from a history of misuse during previous mobilizations.¹²

RCSF INTEGRATION IN THE 1990'S AND BEYOND

Integration of the force is important for a number of reasons, not least of which is the merging of AC and RC into a "total force." The Full Time Support (FTS) program is an excellent vehicle for achieving a large portion of a merging of AC and RC structure. The program currently comprises a combination of active component, Active Guard Reserve (AGR), military technicians (mil-techs), and civil service personnel. The inclusion of the "Individual Mobilization Augmentee" (IMA) category of the Selected Reserve would complete the "integration" implementers.

The driving purpose of FTS is to prepare troop program units (TPUs) for focused training during allocated drill/MUTAs, removing the on-going administrative distractions common to personnel intensive organizations. Possibly no other single program influences RC readiness as directly as the status of FTS.¹³ Unfortunately, the program for the USAR, directly under Army FORSCOM, remains significantly the least funded of the seven DOD Reserve Components.

Congress has long intended that FTS for both the Army Guard and Army Reserve troop program units should achieve a 14% basis. The Army Guard has recently reported Full Time Manning (FTM) at

around 11.8%, while the Army Reserve remains markedly undermanned at less than 9% FTM, or 54% funded with an 8,000 personnel shortfall.¹⁴ Currently projected budgets indicate Active Guard Reserve strength will be reduced substantially by Department of Army,¹⁵ further reducing FTM basis for the Reserve Component.

Active Component participation in the USAR FTS program is approximately 3.8% or 1,045 personnel assigned. AC manning in the RC SFGA in the early 1980 period was often not to an acceptable standard. Shortfalls in this regard were driven by assigning personnel who were potentially in their last duty tour prior to retirement. However, when motivated professional personnel are assigned, regardless of their career progression, the benefit for the RC is substantial. Typical of any reassignment, the newly assigned AC member will (a) have little to no knowledge of the RC, (b) require 6 to 12 months to gain a basic understanding of the RC, and (c) be in a hand-off mode three months before reassignment. However, the resulting two year period of optimum utility is well worth the learn-up period, for these personnel bring the latest AC standards and knowledge directly into the RC troop units.

This program of assigning active component soldiers into RC troop program units is far more productive than posting them to Army "Readiness Commands." Many reserve component officers question the value of resourcing "readiness commands," if the goal is to achieve dynamic readiness in RC units. AC personnel assigned as members of a troop unit are far more credible, motivated and beneficial than the periodically visiting "advisors," and gain an

appreciation for the RC not otherwise achieved.

The importance of the AGR program is substantial. Not only does it provide the technical knowledge regarding the functioning of the RC, but it also provides continuity and corporate memory within the reserve unit. The AGR program provides the basis and strength for all other Full Time Support. Those who believe AC integrated FTS is the primary solution generally have not had the honor to experience the RC readiness situation.

The military technician program is one of debate in the RC. Many would like to see the program completely removed from FTM. However, in certain technical skill areas, aircraft/automotive maintenance for example, mil-techs may be the only alternative based on real availability of MOSQ personnel for those requirements. It remains a topic of some debate, with overall reliance on mil-techs decreasing and in some units being completely removed.

AC integration in the FTM program in support of the RC SFGA has followed a pattern similar to that depicted below:

POSITION	GROUP	BATTALION	COMPANY
Executive Officer/Deputy	AC/AGR	AGR	AGR
Personnel Officer	AGR	AGR	AGR
Personnel/Admin NCO	AGR/TECH	AGR/TECH	AGR/TECH
Operations Officer	AC/AGR	AC/AGR	AGR
Operations NCO	AC/AGR	AC/AGR	AC/AGR
Supply/Log Officer	AGR	AGR	AGR
Supply NCO	AGR	AGR	AGR

Fig.1, CURRENT OPTIMUM FULL TIME MANNING

Each of the RC SFAGA have somewhat different FTM plans, and each is manned to a greater or lesser extent. Most of the companies FTM runs between 5% to 7%, and none of the Groups have approached the Congressional FTM target of 14%. Yet, while the target has not been met, the Reserve Component has been directed to make substantial reductions in existing 10 USC and 32 USC Active Guard Reserve Full-Time Manning strength. Reflecting the Army's macro-methodology for proportional force structure reductions between components, the Reserve Component's existing personnel base is to be reduced, seemingly without regard to remaining structure requirements. Not reducing the RC FTS program at this time would provide an increase in percentage manning, possibly achieving the dynamic Congressional 14%, with no increased demand on the "total force" budget.

The inclusion of IMAs into "total force" integration planning allows for substantial RC participation and support in Active Component commands, as dramatically illustrated during the 1991 Gulf War. These personnel are usually fully screened by the Active Component command and are assigned to that command for all training and mobilized duty. IMAs can also be utilized by the Active Component command in a category-B drilling status of twenty-four UTAs per year, in addition to Annual Training and other EAD status.

Although not mobilized for duty with their parent command, the IMAs of Special Operations Command Central (SOCENT) provided excellent support to USSOCOM, especially in the SOJ2 Directorate. Comprising 84% of assigned strength, from it's establishment

SOCCENT's IMA integration over four years had been one of the most successful and proactive examples of AC:RC integration in the Joint commands. Unfortunately, the depth of that success was blatantly susceptible to the perspective of a new commander, as was evidence during the Gulf War.

The concept of "round-out" is also a method of achieving integration, but it is even less desirable in the case of Reserve Special Forces than for conventional brigade-size units. "Round-out" envisions active counter-part association and a highly instructive interactive relationship between the AC and RC unit. History and experience have shown that this is not the operative reality achieved in most cases. Geography, training time disconnects, and a myriad of unknowns cause the desired high level of association to diminish beyond benefit to either the AC or the RC unit. The benefit of "round-out" to a RC unit's readiness is superficial in most cases. The benefit of integrating AC personnel directly into units has proven in the RC SFGA to highly productive. The key is to keep the in-flow of AC knowledge and standards constant and resident in the units. This integration becomes especially productive when the assigned AC personnel view themselves as members of the RC unit, and not just Regulars assisting the lesser component.

Projecting an optimum FTS model of approximately 14% for RC Special Forces companies, battalions and groups, one might project the following:

POSITION	GROUP	BATTALION	COMPANY
Executive Officer/2IC	AGR/AC	AGR/AC	AGR/AC
Personnel Officer/S1	AGR	AGR	
Personnel NCO	AC/AGR	AC/AGR	
Admin NCO	AGR	AGR	AGR
Asst Pers/Admin NCO	AGR	AGR	
Intell Officer/S2	AGR/AC	AC/AGR	
Intell NCO	AC/AGR	AGR/AC	
Asst Intel NCO	AGR		
Operations Officer/S3	AC	AC/AGR	
Air Ops Officer	AGR/AC		
Operations NCO	AC/AGR	AC/AGR	AC
Asst Ops NCO	AGR		
Finance Officer	AGR		
Asst Finance NCO	AGR		
Logistics Officer/S4	AGR	AGR	
Supply NCO	AC	AC/AGR	AGR
Asst Supply NCO	AGR/AC	AGR	
Medical NCO	AC/AGR	AC/AGR	
Commo Officer	AC/AGR	AC/AGR	
Commo NCO	AGR	AGR	AC
SFODA NCO (6/SF Co.)			AGR/AC
Other Admin/Support	AGR (25)		
TOTAL FTS PERSONNEL	45	15 X 3BN = 45	11 X 9 Co= 99

Fig.2 OPTIMUM 14% FULL TIME MANNING

The model proposes 189 personnel in various combinations of AC and AGR. Where the position indicates either an AGR or an AC requirement, the lead category is the preferred solution. Twenty-five personnel are shown in the "other admin/support" for

parachute-rigger, maintenance, weather, signals, mess and administrative support for the Group. No civilian positions were included as these personnel would be fully deployable in support of operational missions in the operational continuum.

EMPLOYMENT MODELS

Army policy regarding employment of Reserve Component (RC) Special Operations Forces (SOF) remains a question of intent. USSOCOM has been proactive in the use of Reserve Component forces, and the results of the 20 SFGA Desert Storm mobilization reflect this mutual willingness and capability. In the post-DESERT STORM period, CINCSOC continued to offer the validated "combat ready" 20th SFGA for operational use by the Theater CINCs. The intended use was to recapture those Peacetime Engagement missions foregone due to the exigencies of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. The base policy question which drives RC SF readiness and training has two parts: (1) Is there a policy to employ RC SOF in proactive, real world Peacetime Engagement/LIC, and (2) will there be emphasis on enhanced readiness and training for early activation in Regional Contingency operations?"

USSOCOM, in it's head-of-agency role regarding MFP-11 budgeting, is required to conduct joint mission analysis in support of its projections. During the period JAN 90 to JUN 91, USSOCOM Joint Mission Analysis researched and analyzed RC SOF real world availability and employability in the operational continuum, to include routine peaceful competition roles. The following rules

were developed to provide enhanced RC SOF employment parameters:

1. RC Special Forces would be used in the peacetime engagement/LIC role to recover or reestablish operational (training exercise/ mission) shortfalls or unfilled requirements. The primary four legal categories/tiers for accessing RC assets were used, with the requirement that each tier be sourced in sequence before proceeding to the next tier to fill an unresourced requirement:

- I. STANDARD, or "17 DAY RULE" (Annual Training)
- II. VOLUNTARY ACTIVATION, (10 USC, 672)
- III. OPERATIONAL ACTIVATION, (10 USC, 673b)
- IV. MOBILIZATION, (PARTIAL/FULL)

2. Tier I. resources are provided in the standard Annual Training mode of 15-17 days annually. It is the most restrictive for RC employment and does not address a full range of employment parameters. Such an option would be one of meeting longer mission requirements with multiple elements operating in time sequence. Tier I. does not reflect the OCONUS optempo established by RC SOF in the past eight years.

3. TIER II. is essentially voluntary activation or extended active duty (EAD) in various categories, such as "Temporary Tour of Active Duty" (TTAD) and "Active Duty Special Work" (ADSW). Input from RC SFGA units and review of historical OCONUS optempos, indicated a RC SFGA capability to provide EAD individuals and units as indicated below:¹⁶

1 - 17 DAYS	1 - 30 DAYS	1 - 45 DAYS
36 SFODA per SFGA	11 SFODA per SFGA	5 SFODA per SFGA
6 SFODB per SFGA	2 SFODB per SFGA	1 SFODB per SFGA

Fig.3, TIER II RESOURCE AND EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

4. Resources from TIER III are provided through operational activation of derivative UIC units/Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) by executive authority (10 USC, 673b). Duration of employment is 180 days per year for non-combat (CA/PSYOP) forces, and 360 days for combat forces (Special Forces).

5. TIER IV employment parameters are provided within the context of a partial or a full mobilization. It provides unrestricted access of the RC for twenty-four months or the "duration plus six months."

6. Utilization parameters based on employment duration and activity are presented in the following chart. Although Tier III employment must be for operational requirements, not for training, public law does not otherwise prohibit the use of RC SOF in any activity while in an active duty status.

DURATION	TIER II. (VOLUNTARY)	TIER I, III & IV. (INVOLUNTARY)
SHORT (1-17 days)	TRAINING/ MISSION	TRAINING/ MISSION
MEDIUM (1-30 days)	TRAINING/ MISSION	MISSION
LONG (1-45 days)	TRAINING/ MISSION	MISSION

Fig.4, RC SOF EMPLOYMENT PARAMETERS
(DURATION & ACTIVITY)

While the USSOCOM JMA scenarios indicated initiation of 10 USC, 673b, Selected Reserve operational activation within days of a mobilization, this can be argued to be an altogether benign approach to RC employment. A more proactive approach would have operational activation occurring at the same time active Theater apportioned SFGA were alerted or within weeks of deployments for a Regional Contingency. In any regard, one might anticipate an emerging policy based on a more informed and proactive perspective insuring optimization of limited Total SOF resources.

SCENARIO BASED EMPLOYMENT MODELS

Based on the data presented, the models that follow illustrate how these extensive resources can be employed. Hypothetical scenarios, which do not reflect any current or proposed missions, are each of the Theater apportioned RC SFGA. The employment models do, however, incorporate historical optempo data, parameters established by Public Law and concepts provided by numerous Reserve Component SF officers in RC SFGAs. The models are conceptually conservative when compared with the USSOCOM JMA enhanced employment assumptions, previously discussed.

Pre-operational training and identification of personnel requires a twelve month lead from tasker, which is typical for active component long-range planning and training schedules. In particular, this provides sufficient IDT (Inactive Duty Training) / "drills" for training, planning, development of POI, and administrative/logistics preparations for OCONUS deployment.

Deploying units are inspected and "brief-back" to tasker/Theater SOC sixty days prior from deployment, and again fifteen days prior to deployment.

NOTIONAL SCENARIO 1.

TASKING:

THEATER/COUNTRY - SOUTHCOM/Peru
MISSION TYPE - FID
WINDOW/ADMIN - 55 days
OPN'L - 42 days

MISSION SYNOPSIS:

JSCP apportioned RC SFGA conducts a six-week POI Counter-insurgency (CI) course to train Peruvian Army/National Police CI forces in combat patrolling, land navigation, immediate reaction drills, basic demolitions, and raid techniques. Trainees comprise three parachute infantry companies (360) and forty (40) national policemen.

EMPLOYMENT MODEL:

TEAM/ FUNCTION	UNITS	PHASE	DAYS	DUTY STATUS(DAYS)
Cmd/Log Team	1	All	55	FTM + TTAD
SFODA	4	All	45	TTAD
SFODB	1	I	21	AT(15) + TTAD(6)
SFODA	1	I-II	30	AT(15) + TTAD(15)
SFODA	2	I	17	AT(15) + IDT(2)
SFODA	2	I-II	17	AT(15) + IDT(2)
SFODB	1	II	21	AT(15) + TTAD(6)
SFODA	1	I-II	30	AT(15) + TTAD(15)
SFODA	2	II	17	AT(15) + IDT(2)

NOTIONAL SCENARIO 2.

TASKING:

THEATER/COUNTRY - EUCOM/Various
MISSION TYPE - DA/SR/FID
WINDOW/ADMIN - 55 days
OPN'L - 45 days

MISSION SYNOPSIS:

JSCP apportioned RC SFGA establishes SFDB and employs three FID MTTs (Poland, Republic of Russia, and Hungary) and 15 SFODA over a 45 day period in Exercise FLINTLOCK, in support of allied forces combined training in a Peacetime Engagement arena.

EMPLOYMENT MODEL:

TEAM/ FUNCTION	UNITS	PHASE	DAYS	DUTY STATUS(DAYS)
SFDB	1	All	55	FTM + TTAD
SFDB	1	I	21	AT(15) + TTAD(6)
SFODA	3	I	30	AT(15) + TTAD(15)
SFODA	6	I	17	AT(15) + ADT(6)
SFDB	1	II	21	AT(15) + ADT(6)
SFODA	9	II	17	AT(15) + ADT(6)

NOTIONAL SCENARIO 3.

TASKING:

THEATER/COUNTRY - CENTCOM/Kenya
MISSION TYPE - FID
WINDOW/ADMIN - 30 days
OPN'L - 21 days

MISSION SYNOPSIS:

JSCP apportioned RC SFGA is tasked to participate in SOCCENT major exercise, with operational Forward Operating Base and six SFODA. RC forces conduct combined training with Kenyan parachute battalion, emphasizing Direct Action operations and techniques in a counter-insurgency scenario.

EMPLOYMENT MODEL:

TEAM/ FUNCTION	UNITS	PHASE	DAYS	DUTY STATUS(DAYS)
LNO/Log Team	1	All	30	FTM + TTAD
SFODB	1	All	21	AT(15) + TTAD(6)
SFODA	6	All	21	AT(15) + TTAD(6)

NOTIONAL SCENARIO 4.

TASKING:

THEATER/COUNTRY - PACOM/Nepal
 MISSION TYPE - DA/SR/FID
 WINDOW/ADMIN - 30 days
 OPN'L - 21 days

MISSION SYNOPSIS:

Theater apportioned RC SFGA conducts a medical assistance/training operation in support of Royal Nepalese military medical unit. One B Team provides command and control, with three A Teams, to coordinate medical operations for Group Surgeon and medical section, augmented with eighteen SF Medics.

EMPLOYMENT MODEL:

TEAM/ FUNCTION	UNITS	PHASE	DAYS	DUTY STATUS(DAYS)
LNO/Log Team	1	All	30	FTM + TTAD
SFODB	1	I	21	AT(15) + TTAD(6)
SFODA	3	I	21	AT(15) + TTAD(6)
SF Medics	18	I	21	AT(15) + TTAD(6)
Grp Surgeon	1	I	21	AT(15) + TTAD(6)
Medical Sect	1	I	21	AT(15) + TTAD(6)

The models illustrate the various modes or status of active duty which can be used to deploy RC SFGA assets for substantial operational periods in a Peacetime Engagement role. It should be

noted that this capability increases with marginal increases in FTM.

Budget resourcing, in terms of Army National Guard/NGPA and Army Reserve/RPA, has been and will be the real decrement to RC SFGA employment. The US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Command established a 29 day Annual Training policy for it's units starting in 1991. This basically sets aside monies for each soldier to be utilized in an EAD role annually. If the funds are not used by that soldier, they can be applied to another soldier seeking a longer period of active duty. US Army Special Forces Command, the advocacy headquarters for the RC SFGA, would be advised to do the same for it's RC SFGA. This could be the initial effort at establishing an annual EAD agreement with the RC SFGA.

Currently, RC SFGA are not required to set aside or identify specific numbers of SFODA/SFODB for periods greater than the standard Annual Training maximum of 15 days, with a possible two days IDT for an initial assembly day and a stand-down day at home station. It is reasonable to believe that it might be able to coordinate an annual operational commitment from each of the RC SFGA. The USSOCOM JMA parameters were informally discussed at length with planners in all the RC SFGA, and the parameters were found to be generally acceptable.

A possible RC SFGA deployment commitment, based on the USSOCOM JMA model, could provide extended active duty (EAD) assets of one SFODB and five SFODAs for 45 days, and two SFODBs and eleven SFODAs for a 30 day period. These are not inconsequential numbers in view

of typical Theater SOF requirements.

OPERATIONAL PERIOD	SFODB	SFODA
1 - 17 days	3 - 6	30 - 38
1 - 30 days	2	11
1 - 45 days	1	5

Fig.5, EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY ASSETS

These extended employment requirements could be assigned on a rotational basis to the battalions. For example, 1st battalion in year one would have the 45 day requirements, 2nd battalion would provide the 30 day requirements, and the 3rd battalion would provide the standard 17 day commitments. Each year thereafter, the commitments would move to the next battalion in the cycle, etc.

Establishing an agreed extended capability would "normalize" periodic extended commitments for the Groups. The RC SFGA would be able to program these commitments as ongoing, long-range planning requirements, and commanders could begin tailoring their SFODA/SFODB for annualized EAD requirements. Individual soldiers, likewise, would begin projecting into the future by preparing families and employers for the increased optempo.

CONCLUSION

The RC SFGA offer the warfighting CINCs a substantially greater ability to influence their Peacetime Engagement strategies beyond currently accepted force limitations. As illustrated by the background supporting data and the employment models, the RC SFGA are readily available, both legally and operationally, for

employment in the operational continuum. With funding and command intent, the RC SFGA could become highly viable and fully accountable assets to Peacetime Engagement and regional contingency requirements in the post-Cold War era.

Full Time Manning remains the lynch-pin to proactive readiness and employment capability. Senior Army SOF headquarters have never achieved a viable level of representation. In both USSOCOM and US Army Special Operations Command, the AGR staffing is below effective levels. In USSOCOM alone, a headquarters of more than 500 personnel, there are only two RC Special Forces officers currently assigned to assure a Reserve Special Forces perspective for a stated 45% of Total SOF. The level of support in the RC SFGA has generally been little more than 50% of the Congressional target. If these disparities in across the board FTM are not corrected, the long-term viability of the RC SFGA may not portend well. The force structure is too dynamic from a cost and capabilities perspective to continue in the current benign paradigm. The four RC SFGA, available for combat employment within weeks of mobilization, nearly cost less than one standing AC SFGA. Perhaps this has been an unstated paradigm.

The erroneous perception has been that the Reserve Component Special Forces Groups are too difficult to employ proactively on an annual and recurring basis. The fact is, given an understanding and knowledge of the relatively few and rather minimal limiting factors, forty-five percent of the Army's Special Forces are absolutely and resolutely available for operational employment.

APPENDIX A.
RESERVE COMPONENT SPECIAL FORCES GROUPS (AIRBORNE)

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

<u>19TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP(ABN)</u>	
Headquarters & Headquarters Co.	Draper, UT
Support Company	Draper, UT
1st SF Battalion	Camp Williams, UT
2nd SF Battalion	Camp Williams, UT
5th SF Battalion	Ceredo, WV
	Camp George West, CO
<u>20th SPECIAL FORCES GROUP(ABN)</u>	
Headquarters & Headquarters Co.	Birmingham, AL
Support Company	Birmingham, AL
1st SF Battalion	Birmingham, AL
2nd SF Battalion	Huntsville, AL
3rd SF Battalion	Jackson, MS
	Camp Blanding, FL

US ARMY RESERVE

<u>11TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP(ABN)</u>	
Headquarters & Headquarters Co.	Fort Meade, MD
Support Company	Fort Meade, MD
1st SF Battalion	Fort Meade, MD
2nd SF Battalion	Newburgh, NY
3rd SF Battalion	Reynoldsburg, OH
	Perrine, FL
<u>12TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP(ABN)</u>	
Headquarters & Headquarters Co.	Arlington Heights, IL
Support Company	Arlington Heights, IL
1st SF Battalion	Arlington Heights, IL
2nd SF Battalion	Arlington Heights, IL
3rd SF Battalion	Tulsa, OK
	Hamilton Field, CA

APPENDIX B.
1ST SOCOM/ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE STUDY

In July 1988, The US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) was contracted by 1st SOCOM to assess RC SFSA training time sufficiency to meet operational requirements. The report, "An Assessment of Special Forces Reserve Component Training Capabilities," was compiled without RC interface, and throughout makes substantive error regarding the Reserve Component, Special Forces doctrine and the RC SFSA.

The study compared hours required to train for basic proficiency in each of the Special Forces missions with hours nominally available to a Selected Reserve troop program unit. The hours required for training in the four primary Special Forces missions of Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, Unconventional Warfare, and Foreign Internal Defense, was determined by Special Warfare Center.

The Study incorporates the following substantive errors in compilation and analysis:

1. ARI basis for comparison assumes that Special Forces units are required to train in all four SF missions annually. Contrary to this basic assumption, FM80-1, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, states "not all SF units train for all doctrinal SF missions. Mission priorities vary from theater to theater. SF units train to OPLAN requirements not to doctrinal missions...Based on theater war plans, each SF unit is oriented to a specific region of the world...an SFOD normally prepares for no more than two types

of missions."

2. The aggregate hours required for each of the four capabilities were used in total, without consideration for similar/identical training across the four mission areas. Therefore, the hours requirement is vastly over-stated, which projects a substantial short-fall in Reserve force training capability in hours.

3. "Mandatory non-special forces mission activities" hours is subjective and double counts officer and non-commissioned professional development time, and inflates POR training, inspections and formations, and annual training travel time (at 96 hours?).

4. Development of hours available for training is illustrative of superficial knowledge of Reserve Special Forces training. Companies will often train from Friday evening through to Sunday afternoon. Deployments for Training/Fly-Aways, and Field Training Exercises are rarely conducted in an eight hour per day scenario. Additionally, the study was unaware of the provision which authorizes up to six "additional airborne unit training assemblies" (AAUTAs). This provides an additional 48 hours to the hours available for training capability. The base hours of 396 hours should indicate a minimum of 444 hours. Allowing minimally for the aspect of Deployments For Training (DFT) and other intensified training periods, one can conservatively increase the Inactive Duty Training (IDT) as depicted in the presentation below.

5. Feedback from the Reserve Special Forces Groups indicated that no inquiries were conducted by ARI. Such an effort would have clearly surfaced the key driver for RC SFGA training - the warfighting CINCs assign missions and the force trains to accomplish those missions. Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense were not tasked to the RC SFGA.

The following presents hours available to hours required, based on the ARI report:

	ARI PRESENTATION	RC BACKGROUND STUDY
Mission Training Time		
Unconventional Warfare	249.95	N/A
Direct Action	305.2	305.2
Special Reconnaissance	261.2	42* (w/o dup)
	-----	-----
Total hours	816.0	347.2
Mandatory Non-Special Forces		
Mission Training		
Officer Development	12 *dbl acctg	*
Officer/NCO Development*	16	16
Physical Training/APFT	24	24
Wpns Qualification	8	4
CTT Prep & Test	10	8
SQT Prep & Test	10	8
Maintenance(Equip & Veh)	10	10
Inspections/Formations	24	18
Annual Property Inventory	8	4
Processing O'seasRepl(POR)	30	10
Urinalysis Testing	2	2
HTLV (Class & Testing)	4	4
Pre-Mob Briefing	1	1
Mobilization Briefing	1	1
SAEDA & OPSEC Briefings	2	2
Safety Briefings	5	5
Weigh-ins	6	4
Travel To/From AT/Exercise	96	24
	-----	-----
Total hours	275	145
Correct addition	(269)	

Training Time Available			
Annual Training(AT)	204	204	
(17 days X 12 hrs/day)			
Inactive Duty Training(IDT)	192	n/a	n/a
(24 days X 8hrs/day)			
(16 days X 9hrs/day) *			144 *PT hour
(8 days X 12hrs/day) **		n/a	96
**DFT/FTX			
Add'l Abn Unit Training			
Assemblies(AAUTA)	0	48	
(6 days X 8hrs/day)	-----	-----	
Total hours	396	492	
THEREFORE:			
Training Time Required			
Mission	816	347	
Non-mission	269	145	
TOTAL Training Time	-----	-----	
Required	1091	492	
TOTAL Training Time	-----	-----	
Available	396	492	
(SHORTFALL)/BREAK EVEN	(695)	BREAK EVEN	

Warfighting-based Mission Essential Task Lists (METL's) were not used by ARI in this comparative analysis.

APPENDIX C.
OCONUS OPTEMPO CY87-90

1987

20 SFGA	WINTEX/CIMEX (NATO)	HQ AFSOUTH
20 SFGA	EX SCHWARZES PFERD	FRG
1-20 SFGA (ODB+2 ODA)	FTX SCHWARZES PFERD	FRG
(ODB+3 ODA)	FTX TRABUCCO	SPAIN
(ODB+4 ODA)	ROYAL DUTCH MARINES	PUERTO RICO
(ODB+3 ODA)	FTX MULFONE	ITALY
2-20 SFGA	SR/DA ANNUAL TRN	UTAH
3-20 SFGA (1 ODA)	FTX CHERGUI	MOROCCO
(1 ODA)	FTX SAHEL	TUNISIA
(1 ODA)	FTX SCHWARZES PFERD	GERMANY
11 SFGA	WINTEX (NATO)	GERMANY
2-11 SFGA	EX FLINTLOCK	UK
2-11 SFGA	EX BELGIAN SUE	NORWAY
3-11 SFGA (2 ODA)	EX COLD WINTER	GERMANY
3-11 SFGA (2 ODA)	EX ANCHOR EXPRESS	BELGIAN
3-11 SFGA (1 ODA)	DOMBAS GUERRILLA COURSE	ARMY
		NORWAY
		DENMARK
		NORWAY

1988

20 SFGA	EX DENSE CROP (NATO)	HQ AFSOUTH
20 SFGA	EX SCHWARZES PFERD	GERMANY
1-20 SFGA (2 ODA)	FTX MULFONE	ITALY
2-20 SFGA (1 ODA)	EX SCHWARZES PFERD	GERMANY
3-20 SFGA FOB	FLINTLOCK	ITALY
(3 ODA)	EX SCHWARZES PFERD	GERMANY
(ODB+2 ODA)	FTX TRABUCCO	SPAIN
(ODB+2 ODA)	FTX MULFONE	ITALY
1-11 SFGA (5 ODA)	JCRX FLINTLOCK	GERMANY
(1 ODA)	FTX ALPINE FRIENDSHIP	GERMANY
2-11 SFGA	WINTER WARFARE	FT DRUM, NY
3-11 SFGA	WINTER WARFARE	NEW HAMPSHIRE

1989

20 SFGA	WINTEX (NATO)	GERMANY
1-20 SFGA FOB/AOB	WINTEX (NATO)	ITALY
1-20 SFGA (ODB+3 ODA)	FTX MULFONE	ITALY
2-20 SFGA (ODB+2 ODA)	FTX TRABUCCO	SPAIN
3-20 SFGA (2 ODA)	FRENCH COMMANDO JCET	MARTINIQUE
(2 ODA)	GERMAN AIRBORNE	GERMANY

1-11 SFGA FOB (ODB+4 ODA) (2 ODA)	WINTEX/CIMEX EX MOSKUS NORWEG-ARMY SKI COURSE	UK NORWAY NORWAY
1990		
20 SFGA SFOB 1-20 SFGA (2 ODA) 2-20 SFGA (ODB+3 ODA) FOB (2 ODA)	EX DENSE CROP (NATO) FTX IRON PALAS FTX MULFONE FLINTLOCK EX SCHWAREZ FERD	HQ AFSOUTH TURKEY ITALY GERMANY GERMANY
1-11 SFGA (ODB+4 ODA) (2 ODA) (2 ODA) (1 ODA)	EX MOSKUS EX SPRING TRN NORWEG-ARMY SKI COURSE N.WARFARE TRN CTR	NORWAY DENMARK NORWAY ALASKA
2-11 SFGA 3-11 SFGA (ODB+2 ODA)	WINTER WARFARE WINTER WARFARE 23 SAS EXCHANGE	UTAH CP DAWSON HEREFORD, UK

APPENDIX D.
COST ANALYSIS

	FY91	FY92	FY93
AC SFGA (5)			
PAY & ALLOWANCES (MPA)			
EM PERSONNEL	4458	4781	5104
COST FACTOR (CF)	27.3	29.1	30.5
	\$121.7M	\$134.5M	\$155.7M
OFF PERSONNEL	923	986**	1049***
CF	63.3	67.2	70.7
	\$ 58.4M	\$ 66.3M	\$ 74.2M
	-----	-----	-----
TOTAL MPA	\$180.1M	\$200.8M	\$224.9M
O & M	\$ 31.3M	\$ 26.3M	\$ 27.8M
	-----	-----	-----
TOTAL	\$211.4M	\$227.1M	\$252.7M
USAR SFGA (2)			
PAY & ALLOWANCES (RPA)			
EM PERSONNEL	2136	2136	2136
CF	6	6.4	6.7
	\$ 12.8M	\$ 13.7M	\$ 14.3M
OFF PERSONNEL	449	449	449
CF	14.6	15.3	16
	\$ 6.6M	\$ 6.9M	\$ 7.2M
	-----	-----	-----
TOTAL RPA	\$ 19.4M	\$ 20.6M	\$ 21.5M
O & M	\$ 6.4M	\$ 5.1M	\$ 5.1M
	-----	-----	-----
TOTAL	\$ 25.8M	\$ 25.7M	\$ 26.6M
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APPENDIX E.
PUBLIC LAW AND THE MOBILIZATION SPECTRUM

Public law provides the basis for regulations that govern reserve component utilization, the how, when, and where these forces may train and be operationally employed. The primary public law which governs RC training and operational-use/employment is 10 USC, sections 672 and 673, and 32 USC for aspects relating to the National Guard, specifically.

INVOLUNTARY ACTIVE DUTY

Public Law 10 USC, 672, "Reserve Components generally" discusses the basic provisions of involuntary annual active duty for members of the Selected Reserve, under the authority of the various service chiefs. This portion of the law provides "Annual Training" limited to a maximum of 15 days per year, and is the only provision for "involuntary" active duty use of the Reserve Component forces short of an Executive activation. The Law insures that units and individuals of the Selected Reserve receive military training on an annual basis.

Involuntary duty is required of the RC soldier in a "Inactive Duty for Training" (IDT) status, generally accomplished on what is known as the "Drill week-end," comprising multiple "Unit Training Assemblies" (UTAs). The voluntary member in a Troop Program Unit (TPU) is required by regulation to attend 48 UTAs per training/calendar year. Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) are also classified as members of the Selected Reserve. IMAs may also be in

"drill" status--usually Category B status--which requires 24 UTAs per year.

UTAs may be grouped in combinations to accomplish special aspects of the unit's Yearly Training Plan. Units have used MUTA-7s (Thursday afternoon through Sunday), for example, to conduct Deployments-For-Training (DFTs) or "fly-aways," which encompass Airborne deployments to distant major training locations for FTX/Specialized Warfare sustainment training.

In summary, "involuntary" use of RC SFGA prior to Executive/Operational Activation, is limited to a maximum of 15 days per year and to a total of 48-54 UTAs in an Inactive Duty for Training (IDT) status.

VOLUNTARY ACTIVE DUTY

Individual reserve component soldiers and units are available voluntarily for active duty, prior to Executive/Congressional Activation or Mobilization of the Reserve, for unlimited use of trained (minimum of 16 weeks basic training) RC volunteers, whose service is generally limited to 179 days per year. The 179 day rule is an administrative guide-line in order to adhere to Congressionally established AC end-strengths. Major commands have the authority to waive the 179 day limitation.

Temporary Tour of Active Duty (TTAD) and Active Duty Special Work (ADSW) are the two primary classifications of duty for RC volunteers on active duty. TTAD supports the Active Component, in order to bring Reserve expertise to an AC requirement or issue. Pay and allowances are provided from the accounting "basket" known

as Military Personnel Appropriations (MPA). ADSW supports reserve work/projects, and is funded with Reserve Personnel Appropriations (RPA/NGPA).

The major planning consideration is that RC personnel (with minimum of 16 weeks basic training) are voluntarily available for operational commitments across the conflict continuum. Public law places no limitations on the nature of the active duty. As an example, consider that the former Secretary of the Navy Lehman flew combat missions from carriers during the Vietnam War while on Annual Training and other periods of voluntary active duty.

SELECTED RESERVE ACTIVATION (200K CALL-UP)

Ready access of Selected Reserve personnel and units, by-law limited to 1.2 million personnel, is provided by an expansive and flexible statute--Title 10 of US Public Law, Section 673, para b. The law provides for the activation of from one to 200,000 personnel by Executive/Presidential order. Congressional and War Powers Act provisions do not affect the President's exercising this law. The intent of the law is to provide the President the unencumbered use of Selected Reserves for reasonable periods. Congress strengthened the law in 1986, and again in Nov 90 during Operation Desert Shield to increase the viable use of combat forces. The law is not restrictive in nature of operational employment, and places no limitations based on operational continuum (Peacetime Engagement). However, based on historical misuse of the Reserve Component, activation under these provisions

is for operational use only, and not for training.

During the Gulf War, Congress increased the utilization period for combat units from 90 days, with an automatic extension period of 90 days, to an aggregate availability period of 360 days. Support units remained available for an initial 90 days, and a 90-day extension. The law currently is based on 90 days with an additional 90 day for all units, combat or support. Department of Defense is working an action to re-establish the 180 days, plus 180 days additional for combat units, and indicates that this will become law.

The law also allows for tailoring of these forces in support of the Total Force, by using "derivative UICs," in much the same manner as the US Air Force has for many years in its proactive use of RC air assets.

The Selected Reserve is, by-law, a sub-set of the Ready Reserve. The Selected Reserve comprises those individuals, Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) and personnel in Troop Program Units (TPUs) who "drill"/train on a regular basis and receive pay, limited benefits and reserve retirement program credit. The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) is comprised of trained individuals who may be Mobilized as augmentation personnel. Individuals of the IRR can be involuntarily employed for a maximum of fifteen days per year. However, they can be voluntarily assigned to a Selected Reserve TPU/unit prior to the involuntary activation of the selected reserve unit.

THE 200K FORCE-LIST

"200K Force List" is a somewhat confusing aspect regarding Selected Reserve activation under the law. DOD/JCS established a readiness tool referred to as the "200K Force List." The RC units identified as "200K Units" benefit from a higher priority for training, funding and equipment. There is one JCS force list comprising an aggregate 200,000 personnel, identified by the warfighting CINCs as priority call-up units. Confusion occurs when the "200K Force List" is viewed as the sole basis for Activation of the Selected Reserve under 10 USC, 673b. To reiterate, any unit or number of individuals in the 1.2 million Selected Reserve (up to 200,000) is available for immediate Activation by the President for any period up to an aggregate of 180 days, and if combat forces, for up to 360 days.

SOLDIERS AND SAILORS RELIEF ACT

"The Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act(s)," 38 USC, section 2021-2026, primarily provides employment and property protection for RC personnel on active duty. The law covers a federalized RC person for up to four years, and for five years if the member is at sea over four years. The law is specific that it does not matter whether that active duty is voluntary or involuntary active duty. Although laws protect RC personnel from the loss of their employment on returning to the civilian work place, experienced RC personnel know that reality requires communication and an understanding with one's employer. Federal

court may win the battle, but the future would generally not bode well for such continued employment. This aspect is very much a "personal matter" and all experienced RC personnel handle it with few illusions. Concern over re-employment should not be used as a reason for not utilizing the Reserve Component.

APPENDIX F.
GLOSSARY

AAUTA - Additional Airborne Unit Training Assembly.

AC - Active Component.

ADSW - Active Duty for Special Work. Replaces Special Active Duty for Training (SADT) as a duty category. Its primary purpose is to accomplish one-time, short duration projects (up to 179 days) which are vital to the functioning of the Army Reserve. Any training received is incidental to the tour.

ADT - Active Duty for Training. This type of active duty is performed by any Reservist attending a school, counterpart training or other special training activities.

AGR - Active Guard/Reserve. Army reservists or guardsman on full-time active duty in support of Reserve Component units and/or programs. AGR personnel are administered respectively by National Guard Bureau and Office Chief of Army Reserve.

ARCOM - Army Reserve Command. One of 21 geographic major Army reserve commands throughout the US (plus one in Germany). Most (but not all) Army reserve units are subordinate to an ARCOM, which is commanded by a Reserve major general.

ARPERCEN - Army Reserve Personnel Center in St. Louis, Mo. The nationwide administrative and personnel management center for the Army Reserve. It is the headquarters to AGR, IMA and IRR Reservists.

ARNG - Army National Guard.

ARTEP - Army Training and Evaluation Program.

AT - Annual Training. Active duty performed annually (usually for two weeks) by Reserve Component units and IMA Reservists. IRR members may also periods of AT.

CONUSA - Continental US Army. The five numbered Army headquarters, which are subordinate to FORSCOM and command Army Reserve units in the various geographic regions. CONUSAs are commanded by Regular Army lieutenant generals.

DFT - Deployment for Training.

FLY-AWAY - A DFT typically commencing on a Thursday or Friday evening, with night combat equipment parachute "infiltration" jump into a training area or an exercise.

GOCOM - General Officer Command. A unit of the Reserve Component with a general officer commanding.

IDT - Inactive Duty Training. Defined by AR 140-1. The most common example of IDT is weekend drill.

IMA - Individual Mobilization Augmentee. A Reservist who is assigned to an active Army unit or agency with which he or she would mobilize. IMAs are normally required to conduct their AT, and if DIMAs (Drilling IMAs) all paid IDT with the assigned unit.

IRR - Individual Ready Reserve. A Reservist who does not belong to a Reserve unit or hold an IMA assignment. IRR soldiers are not part of the Selected Reserve, do not normally drill in IDT status, but may serve tours of ADT. IRR is controlled by ARPERCEN.

MACOM - Major Army Command.

METL - Mission Essential Task List.

MOSQ - Military Occupational Skill Qualification.

MUSARC - Major US Army Reserve Command. The highest level of USAR unit commanded by a Reserve general officer. All ARCOMs, Divisions (Training) and any GOCOM with a major general commanding is a MUSARC.

MUTA - Multiple Unit Training Assembly. Comprising more than one minimum of a four hour training period for pay. A MUTA-2 comprises two of these training periods, normally equivalent to a training day. The MUTA-4 is the most common period, and often referred to as a "weekend drill."

NGB - National Guard Bureau.

OCAR - Office Chief of Army Reserve.

ODT - Overseas Deployment Training.

PERSCOM - Total Army personnel Command, formerly Total Army Personnel Agency (TAPA) and Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN). Agency is the active component counterpart to ARPERCEN, and has some responsibility for Reserve Component matters.

RC - Reserve Component. Each Service of the military has a regular component and one or more reserve components. The Army has two, the US Army Reserve and the Army National Guard of the United States.

SELECTED RESERVE - By law, comprises no more than 1.2 million personnel of all services. These are the drilling RC personnel available for immediate activation under provisions of 10 USC, 673b.

SFAS - Special Forces Assessment and Selection. Process conducted at Ft. Bragg evaluating volunteers to determine if qualified mentally, physically and psychologically for attendance the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC).

SFODA/B - Special Forces Operational Detachment A or B. The basic Special Forces operating unit is the "A" team of twelve men, with resident MOSQ specialties.

TAG - The Adjutant General; each State has one and is most often the appointed head of that State National Guard and in some cases of the State militia, also.

TTAD - Temporary Tour of Active Duty. Active Duty in support of Active Component requirements.

TPU - Troop Program Unit. RC units of the Selected Reserve which normally train 48 MUTA and 14 days of AT, annually. These are operational units with varying levels of readiness required.

USACAPOC - US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, headquartered at Fort Bragg, NC, and subordinate command of MACOM USASOC.

USASFC - US Army Special Forces Command, headquartered at Fort Bragg, NC, and subordinate command of MACOM USASOC.

USASOC - US Army Special Operations Command, headquartered at Fort Bragg, NC is the Army SOF major command (MACOM).

UTA - Unit Training Assembly.

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